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Abstract: Plato’s invention of the metaphor of carving the world by the joints
(Phaedrus 265d–66c) gives him a privileged place in the history of natural kind theory
in philosophy and science; he is often understood to present a paradigmatic but
antiquated view of natural kinds as possessing eternal, immutable, necessary
essences. Yet, I highlight that, as apoint of distinction fromcontemporary views about
natural kinds, Plato subscribes to an intelligent-design, teleological framework, in
which thenaturalworld is theproduct of craft and, as a result, is structured such that it
is good for it to be that way. In Plato’s Philebus, the character Socrates introduces a
method of inquiry whose articulation of natural kinds enables it to confer expert
knowledge, such as literacy.Mypaper contributes to an understanding of Plato’s view
of natural kinds by interpreting this method in light of Plato’s teleological conception
of nature. I argue that a human inquirer who uses the method identifies kinds with
relational essences within a system causally related to the production of some unique
craft-object, such as writing. As a result, I recast Plato’s place in the history of
philosophy, including Plato’s view of the relation between the kinds according to the
natural and social sciences.Whereas someare inclined to separate natural from social
kinds, Plato holds the unique view that all naturalness is a social feature of kinds
reflecting the role of intelligent agency.
Keywords: method of division, natural kinds, Philebus, Plato
1 Introduction
In Plato’s Philebus, Socrates introduces a method of inquiry that allows humans to
create traditions of expert knowledge in society. ‘It is a gift from gods to people’,
Socrates says, ‘hurled down by some Prometheus along with a most dazzling fire’
(Phil. 16c5–7), and ‘responsible for every discovery in every craft whatsoever’ (16c2–3).1
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I will call this method the ‘Promethean method’ after its origin and social function as
the source of craft knowledge,2 although it also goes by ‘the divine method’, ‘the
god-given way’, and similar variations in the scholarly literature. While I will char-
acterize it in more detail below, the basic idea is to count sub-kinds of a superordinate
kind in a certain way. For example, Socrates describes the letters of the alphabet as
sub-kinds of spoken sound that one can come to learn through using the Promethean
method. The point of engaging in such a practice is to learn the schematics of
sub-kinds, such as an alphabet, that serve as the basis for some expert knowledge,
such as literacy.
In this paper, I defend an interpretation of how the Promethean method
articulates natural kinds. There are different ways to understand the definition of a
kind, but intuitively, a kind is a set of individuals that share some common property;
kinds are often relevant in the context of some classification.3 For example, individual
Volvos belong to the kinds, Volvo, passenger vehicle, and metal object. A kind is
‘natural’ when it ‘carves the world by its natural joints’, which I interpret to mean,
when it plays some important explanatory role in determining the way the world is
independently of human interpretation of it, thereby gaining a privileged meta-
physical status and constituting a goal of scientific inquiry.4 Philosophers of science
debate what it means for a kind to be natural, but they are often guided by actual
natural sciences: paradigmatic natural kinds are zoological species, chemical
elements, and sub-atomic particles.
I defend two key claims relating to Plato and natural kinds. First, the definition
of a natural kind is a subject of debate in contemporary literature, with several
2 In Greek mythology, Prometheus was seen as an important source of technical knowledge
allowing for the complex structure of human society, represented by his infamous theft of fire from
Zeus and gift of thatfire to humanbeings. See Thomas (2006) formore discussion. Cf. Plato’smyths
of human origins at Plt. 274b5–d9 and Prot. 321c–322d.
3 For example, Khalidi (2013: 1) explains kinds thus: ‘We are a classifying species. We recognize
not just individuals but kinds of things, and we sort individuals into kinds… These include kinds
of entity or object, process or state, and so on.’
4 For example, Khalidi (2013: 1), frames the issue of natural kinds thus: ‘In the face of such a
proliferation of kinds, philosophers are prone to ask whether all of them are on a par, or whether
some are real and others merely ersatz, artificial, or nominal … Many, if not most, are simply
convenient groupings, with limited utility for some purpose or another, but without a claim to
“carving nature at its joints”’ (See also Hacking (1991), who asks which ‘common nouns’ refer to
‘natural kinds’). More elaborately, Haslanger (2014: 129) explains: ‘First, metaphysically, natural
kinds are “mind-independent” and they constitute “the world’s joints.” Second, epistemologi-
cally, good explanation depends on tracking natural kinds. Because natural kinds are responsible
for the structure and behavior of the world, our explanations of how the world works can only be
adequate if they capture this structure.’
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philosophers of science staking out incompatible positions.5 In the context of
defining natural kinds, Plato is sometimes accused of holding the antiquated
position that a kind is natural just because it possesses a mysterious ‘essence’,
thereby grafting inappropriate metaphysical entities onto the natural world.6
Moreover, some scholars oppose a natural kind to a socially-constructed kind, by
contrasting the independent existence of natural kinds with those that arise due to
human activity.7 As a result, Plato might plausibly be associated with those who
make a hard distinction between natural and socially-constructed kinds, on the
grounds that socially-constructed kinds lack essences. Alternatively, and more
damning for Plato, his position might plausibly be associated with the problematic
naturalizing of socially-constructed kinds as if they had essences, e.g., the belief that
racial hierarchy is grounded in biologically real essences.8
This impression of Plato andhis place in the history of philosophy and science, I
argue, relies on an impoverished understanding of his conception of natural kinds.
Using the Philebus’ discussion of the Promethen method as my central text, I argue
that Plato develops a nuanced conception of natural kinds that draws on his ideas
about the connection between craft, nature, and society.9 I maintain that according
to the Prometheanmethod, kinds are naturalwhenandbecause they are intelligently
designed division-schemes that represent the underlying causal relations involved in
the production of the craft-object to which they are connected. For instance,
5 See, for example, Boyd (1999), Devitt (2008, 2020), Hempel (1965: 146–7), Khalidi (2013),
Spencer (2014), and Wilson et al. (2007).
6 See Devitt (2008, 2020), who defends traditional biological essentialism against this and other
objections; Boyd (1999) and Wilson et al. (2007) offer critical alternatives. The evolutionary biol-
ogist Ernest Mayr claimed that Plato was a ‘disaster’ for ‘biology’ given his backwards views about
essences in nature, i.e., the traditional metaphysical view (see Powers 2013: 714).
7 A central example is Hacking (1991), who maintains that there is a sharp distinction between
natural and ‘human’ kinds; see Cooper (2004) and Haslanger (2014) for criticism. Haslanger (1995,
2015), Khalidi (2013: chapter 4), and Spencer (2015, 2014) develop positions according to which
social and natural kinds are not fundamentally distinct, in response to the common view that
separates them.
8 Gould (1978), Menand (2001: 101–112), and Spencer (2014: 1036) claims to defend biological
racial realism partly to obstruct ‘individuals [who] wish to make claims about one race being
superior to another in some respect’. Cf. the criticism of ideas about a supposed “state of nature” in
social contract theory by Mills (1997). Similar examples of problematic naturalizing can be found,
for instance, regarding sexuality and gender (see Corvino 2013: 77–97; Mercer 2018). Haslanger
(2015: 129) also refers to natural kind theory’s ‘complicated history full of controversies and
confusions’.
9 One important dis-analogy between contemporary debates and Plato’s view of natural kinds is
that Plato is, in the contexts examined in this paper, primarily concerned with naturalness as a
feature among kinds, in particular, as a relation among sub-kinds of a single superordinate kind;
by contrast, most contemporary debates concern a kind in relation to particulars.
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alphabets and musical notations coordinate the causal profiles of different kinds of
vocalization and pitched sound, thereby providing experts with the ability to
combine different kinds to write speeches or compose songs.10
A central part of my thesis is that this teleological view of the kinds relevant to
crafts reflects Plato’s broader conception of the natural world: because the natural
world (e.g., species and elements) is the product of craft (τέχνη), through the agency
of craftsmen (δημιουργοί) and their capacity for intelligence (νοῦς), the world is such
that it is good for it to be that way, since it is designed to satisfy the good ends of its
divine crafters as far as possible (Phd. 97c–98b, Ti. 28b–30c, 41a–42e, Phil. 26e-27c,
28c–30e).11 Similarly, Imaintain that a practitioner of thePrometheanmethod learns
how to organize the ‘rawmaterial’ of their craft, like sound, in the ways that are best
for supporting human life, by coordinating the material into a system of discrete
kinds that are causally related to the craft-object of the expertise. In this sense, each
division-scheme is relative to the craft-object, and is indirectly relative to what
benefits human beings as a whole.
As a result, I suggest that Plato holds neither the antiquated view of natural kinds
according to which they are merely the kinds possessing essences, nor the view that
natural and social kinds are fundamentally distinct. Rather, Plato understands the
essences of natural kinds to be posterior to, and determined by, more fundamental
intelligent agents; nature’s joints are determined by the purposes of agents in their
capacity as intelligent creatures, aswell as by the relations between jointswithin each
domain-specific system.12 Moreover, the purposes of intelligent agents always
contribute to what benefits humans as a whole, because humans are intelligent
creatures, and practicing intelligently designed activities (like writing and reading,
performing or listening to music) expresses their capacity for intelligence and
10 This ‘ingredient’model of Promethean intermediaries is articulated in Delcomminette (2006),
Harte (2002), Moravscik (1979), and Thomas (2006). However, I claim that there are two different,
but related, ingredient-laden structures at issue: (1) the system discovered by the Promethean
method, and (2) the composition of the craft product whose existence the discovered system
enables. For instance, themethod transforms pitched sound into the system of notes, intervals, and
scales that can then be used by a musician in the production of themusical harmonies (17c11–d7).
The closest position articulated in the literature is Delcomminette (2006: 137–141): Promethean
kinds are the ‘precondition’ for the combination of sounds in musical harmonies and dancing
rhythms (137–141).
11 The specific Greek terms provided for each concept above are not exact; Plato uses many related
terms within his intelligent-design teleology. See especially Menn (1995), as well as Broadie (2012),
Lennox (2001), Johansen (2004), andMueller (1998) onwhat Lennox describes as Plato’s ‘unnatural
teleology’.
12 In this respect, Plato disagreeswith somecontemporary defenders of natural kind essentialism,
e.g., Devit (2008, 2020), who argues that biological essences are non-relational. Cf. Haslanger
(2015).
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contributes to their own internal rational order, in addition to having instrumental
social benefits.13 The general direction of my account is to emphasize the depth of
Plato’s commitment to the role of intelligence in structuring both the natural and
social world.
Oneof themore radical consequences ofmy interpretation is that, onmyaccount,
Plato’s view is that all natural kinds are socially constructed, in the sense that they are
natural because they reflect the intelligence of the agents that identify them.14 Indeed,
the kind of activity in which the gods engage is, on this account, not fundamentally
different from the kind of activity in which humans engage in order to structure their
world. Yet, there is a distinction between divine agents producing the kinds in the
natural world, and human agents producing the kinds in the human world vis-à-vis
the crafts, which corresponds roughly to the traditional division between natural and
social kinds. Moreover, there is a further distinction between different kinds of intel-
ligent agents corresponding to the different crafts. For instance, sound can be both
essentially the systemofmusicand the systemofwriting, insofar as soundhasmultiple
determinable aspects of differentiation (e.g., pitch, voice). In this sense, while Plato
attributes essences to social kinds, he is committed to a pluralism about the essences
of individual kinds as a result of his social constructionist view and his connection of
naturalness to intelligent purposes and values.15
13 For example, craft division-schemes are part of the social coordination needed for political
society, as I discuss more below. Cf. Plt. 274b–e: humans acquired ‘fire from Prometheus, crafts
from Hephaestus and his fellow craftworker, seeds and plants from others. Everything that has
helped to establish human life has come about from these things … they had to live their lives
through their own resources and take care for themselves, just like the cosmos as a whole, which
we imitate and follow for all time’ (tr. Rowe).
14 While the naturalness of kinds reflects their independent causal profiles, the actual natural
kinds result from organizing these profiles into a system that produces some good (e.g., different
human body parts, because of their causal capacities, are organized to contribute in differentways
to the rational rule of the human soul; in a similar way, letters are causal kinds of oral sound
organized to contribute in differentways towritten speech). Inmy view, Plato explains the unity of
the natural and the social by maintaining that there is a perfect overlap between theoretical and
practical reason: how the world is by nature is exactly how it is structured by intelligent agency.
This is consistent, for example, with Haslanger’s (1995: 97) definition of ‘generic social con-
structionism’, as well as more specific forms, such as ‘causal constructionism’ (98).
15 Nonetheless, I do not endorse or recommend Plato’s view. For instance, the version of social
constructionism I attribute to Plato fails to provide the historical contextualization characteristic of
many contemporary conceptions of social kinds (e.g., Haslanger 2015; cf. Taylor 2020). Still, I think
it is worth examining Plato’s version of social constructionism about natural kinds in order to gain
greater clarity on how Plato develops ideologies that naturalize social structures in the way
critiqued, for instance, inMills (1997) andMercer (2018). I hope to show that Plato defends a poorly
understood view of natural and social kinds that agrees with modern social constructionism in
some respects, while diverging in other ways—this is compatible with thinking that his brand of
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In addition re-casting Plato’s place in the history of philosophy in this way, I
will also defend an interpretation of the Promethean method of the Philebus
against alternatives presented in the scholarship on Plato’s method.16 In partic-
ular, some scholars distinguish the Promethean method from the method of
‘collecting and dividing kinds’ as described in Plato’s Sophist, Statesman, and
Phaedrus, insofar as they see the Promethean method as a special method
pertaining to craft.17 I argue that the Promethean method is an application of the
method of collection and division to teleological inquiry. In this way, themethod is
both an example of collection and division of kinds and amethod pertaining to the
crafts.
2 Promethean Natural Kinds
My central claim regarding Plato’s method is that, through the Promethean
method, Plato establishes a crucial continuity between human kinds, like the
components of crafts, and his intelligent-design or teleological account of the
natural world. On the one hand, Socrates establishes the special social function of
the method as the source of all craft discoveries (16c2–3). It is part of an ancient
‘tale’ handed down from ancient forebearers (16c5–10) that the gods delivered this
method of inquiry to human beings in order for them ‘to inquire and learn and
teach each other’ (16e3–4). Later on, Socrates provides two examples of using the
method to count one form (μίαν ἰδέαν) at a time, until one grasps whatever
‘number’ there are (16c10–d7): identifying sound as ‘one thing going through the
mouth’ in the case of literacy, and identifying sound as ‘one form’ in the case of
music.18 Students become literate through counting the many forms of oral sound
that constitute letters (17a8–b9), and become musical through counting all of the
many forms of pitched sound that constitute the musical notes, intervals, and
social constructionism is problematically ideological. For more discussion of Plato’s views on
socially constructed kinds like race and social class, see Zack (2018: 3–6) and Kamtekar (2002).
16 Cf. Barker (1996), Delcomminette (2006), Miller (1990), Meinwald (1998), and Thomas (2006).
17 Gosling (1975), Harte (2002: 177–211), Moravcsik (1979), and Frede (1997).
18 Although ‘sound’ (φωνή) is the single form Socrates counts first both times, in the first case, sound
is ‘one going through the mouth’ (17b3–4), while in the second, sound is ‘one in the musical art’, in
which ‘high and low’ and ‘equal’ are second and third forms (17c1–5) (These latter are defective
instances of counting,which I donot have space to examine here; seeDelcomminette 2006: 136–8). To
make sense of this, Gill (2010b: 105–7) argues that sound is a genus with two determinable axes of
difference, vocalization and pitch.Gosling (1975: 170–1), Thomas (2006: 223), and Harte (2002: 207–8)
similarly emphasize that there are different ways of counting the intermediaries of the same form that
are specific to different crafts.
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scales (17b11–d3) and their accompanying dancing rhythms (17d3–7). In any use of
the method, the core epistemic content, which confers expertise, is knowledge of
the ‘intermediaries’ (τὰ … μέσα, 16d7, cf. 17b7, 17c11). The intermediaries are the
‘many’ sub-kinds that Socrates describes as ‘in between’ the ‘one’ and the
‘unlimited’. For example, the specific letters that serve as the elements of literacy
are ‘intermediaries’. One cannot become ‘wise’ or ‘well-reputed’ without knowing
these (17b6–9, c7–e6), which ‘distinguishes engaging in dialectical and eristical
discourse with each other’ (17a3–5).
Nonetheless, the method also purports to identify the natural divisions among
and between forms such that one has knowledge of how they are structured as
natural superordinate kinds containing distinct natural sub-kinds. The foundational
assumption of the method is that ‘the things always said to be are made of one and
many and have in them by nature [σύμφυτον] limit and unlimited’ (16c9–10).19
Moreover, Socrates describes the method as a means of knowing that resolves the
‘natural’ paradox ‘by nature’ (14c7–9), namely, that ‘the many are one and the one
many’.20 He compares this paradox to a person ‘having divided an [animal’s] limbs
and at the same time its parts, and having secured agreement that it is one’, then
mockinglydeclaring that ‘theone ismanyandunlimited, and themanyareoneonly’
(14d8–e4). As I develop in more detail below, this analogy to the naturalness of
animal bodies and their parts is essential to understanding the structure of
Promethean kinds. Although there is some dis-analogy in the construction of the
animal bodies in Plato’s natural science and the discovery of the knowledge of crafts
19 Controversially, Gosling (1975: 173) and Reshotko (2010), take ‘always’ to modify ‘said’, such
that the referents of the line are the things always spoken of, which may not be eternal and
imperishable forms. Dancy (2007: 56–60), Hackforth (1958), Moravcsik (1979: 89), and Striker
(1970: 17–23), take ‘always’ to modify ‘to be’, such that the referents of the line are always existing
things, i.e., forms. One motivation for the first reading is that the objects that have limit and
unlimited in themare, according to the fourfolddivision,mixtures that come into being, rather than
imperishable forms (Dancy 2007; Reshotko 2010). However, Socrates uses similar language to
describe the source of the controversy from the natural paradox: ‘we say that the same thing
coming to be one and many through discourse flits around everywhere in the case of each of the
things always said [καθ᾿ ἕκαστον τῶν λεγομένων ἀεί]’ (15d4–6). These objects are imperishable
unities like human, ox, the beautiful, and the good, whichmeans that by ‘the things always said to
be’, he must have in mind things that do not come to be or perish (which may be why they are
always in our discourse). For example, while we observe the letters and musical notes as the
particular forms of speech/writing and music familiar in human culture, this is because eternal,
unchanging forms immanently structure the universe—according to the Timaeus, the ‘harmony’ of
the universe is present in the ‘harmony’ of music (Ti. 47c–e, cf. Phlb. 51d, 56a, and the microcosm-
macrocosm parallel, 29b–30c).
20 That the Promethean method is an epistemic solution to this paradox is clear at 16b–c, where
Socrates tells Protarchus that they must follow the path he has ‘always admired’ and that is
especially ‘fine’, in response to the difficulties posed by the paradox.
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described here, I propose that in each case, intelligent agents identify the natural
kinds by determining how the causal capacities of a world that already exists can be
coordinated in a way that achieve ends supporting rational life.
An important component of my case for a teleological interpretation of
Promethean natural kinds is Socrates’ account of a parallel to this ‘top-down’ use of
themethod, which beginswith one general form and involves learning an established
expertise, namely, how pioneers of crafts use the method to create expertise. Unlike
those in the description above, these practitioners use the method to go ‘from the
unlimited to the one’ rather than ‘from the one to the unlimited’. In other words, they
start withwhat does not appear to be a unified domain of knowledge and findways to
organize thedomain intoan expertise. For example, thepioneer ofwritten literacy, the
Egyptian Theuth, uses the method to identify the letters within unlimited sound
(18b6–d2).21 According to Socrates, Theuth discovers literacy by first noticing that
vowels, ‘those that sound’ (τὰ φωνήεντα), are ‘many’ forms within ‘unlimited sound’
(18b6–c3). He then observes that there is a separate form, those that ‘do not have
sound, butmake somenoise’ (ἕτεραφωνής μὲν οὔ,φθόγγου δὲ μετέχοντά τινος), and
yet another formcalled ‘mute’or ‘unsounding’ (ἄφωνα).22 Theuth thendivides each of
these three discovered forms ‘up to each one’ (διῄρει… μέχρι ἑνὸς ἑκάστου), until he
grasps the ‘number’ of them (18c3–6). Finally, he realizes that ‘none of us can learn
one alone by itself without all the rest’, and assesses that ‘this bond, being one,makes
all these also somehow one’, such that he declares ‘the art of literacy as one set over
them’ (18c7–d2). This discovery of how we are able to learn the letters corresponds to
Socrates’ generalized description of the Prometheanmethod as away of learning and
teaching each other (16e4), so that the example of Theuth provides insight into what
enables this learning and teaching.
I claim that the correct interpretation of Theuth’s pioneering is teleological, in
the following sense. Theuth collects and divides sound into a system of functionally
related forms that play different roles in contributing to written communication as a
whole—experts in this domain (the literate) use the different kinds to produce
writing and reading.What allows him to coordinate this familiar system is looking to
21 I follow the tentative consensus in the literature that Theuth beginswith ‘unlimited’ sound in the
sense of utterly different kinds of speech along an unbounded spectrum of sound-quality, rather
than infinite token phonemes. That is, each sound is a new (even slightly) kind of sound, on this
initial conception. See Delcomminette (2006: 117, 125–153), Gosling (1975:86, 170–1), Meinwald
(1998: 170–1), Menn (1998: 294), Moravcisk (1979: 88–93), Harte (2002: 206), Henry (2011: 245), and
Kahn (2010: 62–3).
22 Gill (2012: 221–222) claims that the middle group consists in iota and upsilon, the liquids
(lambda and rho) and nasals (mu, nu, and gamma-nasal), and sigma, which roughly corre-
sponds to the division between voiced and voiceless in Smyth's (1956: section 22) table of
consonants.
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the different kinds in oral communication, which are differentiated by their causal
features.23 The vowels, semi-mutes, and mutes are described as those that ‘sound’,
those that ‘donot sound, butmake somenoise’, and those thatwe call ‘unsounding’.
The lack of stricture on the vocal cord, for instance, is a distinguishing mark of
vowels, which is plausibly why Socrates describes them as those that ‘sound’.24
Voice, mouth closure, the positions of the tongue and teeth, and so on, physically
account for the difference between sounds in oral speech. Indeed, in the Theaetetus,
the dialogue’s namesake claims that sigma is one of the ‘unsounding, but is some
noise only, such as hissing of the tongue’, while beta and most letters have ‘neither
sound nor noise’, and the ‘seven clearest’ have ‘sound only’ (Theat. 203b2–8). Being
responsible for the understanding of the alphabet that Theaetetus expresses as a
literate Greek, I claim that Theuth identifies the different qualities of oral sound
insofar as they havedifferent causal profiles.25He transcribes the different kinds into
a system of written figures that provide information about to what uses the different
causal powers in our constitution can be put—from one set (oral production of
language) to another (writing and reading language).26 Generalized to all craft, I
suggest that this is part of the essence of a ‘Promethean’ natural kind: the
23 Inmyview,what I amcalling the ‘causal feature’ of a given letter corresponds towhat is involved
in producing that sound, which then serves as the basis for coordination with other letters in the
production of speech. In this sense, according to the Aristotelian taxonomy of causes, the causal
features of speech are individuated by their efficient (productive) profiles, which in turn provides
material causal profiles, i.e., the efficient causal profiles serve as the basis for expert manipulation
into a craft-object. Compare the discussion of ‘auxiliary causes’ in the Timaeus (e.g., 45b–47a) and
Phaedo (98c–99d), and the division of ‘cooperative arts’ in the Statesman (280e–283a), discussed in
Section 4 below.
24 It is plausible that this reflects a broader viewof underlying causal processes as the sources of the
differentiating qualities in a division-scheme. For example, later in the Philebus, Socrates puts the
division of pleasure into true and false in terms of pleasures taking on different qualities, just as
judgements take ondifferent qualities (37b10–c10). Yet, the source of these different qualities are the
causal processes of restoration and/or destruction that gives rise to pleasure or pain (for instance,
falsely appearing mixed pleasures have distinctive underlying causal processes); a similar point is
made early on, when Protarchus denies that pleasures are different in anything other than their
sources (12d7–e2). In this way, I suggest, Plato understands the division of sound based on different
kinds of sound-quality in terms of the causal sources of those qualities.
25 Whywould Theuth know to do this in the first place? I don’t think Socrates offers answer here;
instead, it is plausible that Theuth’s semi-divine nature explains his special insights (his ability to
‘discern’, κατανοέω), forwhichwe are offeredno account. On the persistence of brute insight in the
method of collection and division, see Henry (2011).
26 It seems plausible that part of the heroic feat Socrates attributes to Theuth (‘some god or divine
man’, 18b6–7) is seeing how oral sound has a structure that can be transcribed with figures
corresponding to different parts, such that the figures can be used to convey some of the same
meanings.
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coordination of causally distinct kinds in relation to a craft-object. In this way, the
Prometheanmethod involves the intelligent coordination of amaterial such that it is
good for thatmaterial to be organized thatway (e.g., vocalized sound organized into
the alphabet).
Further, Theuth’s discovery of the ‘bond’ that makes the letters ‘somehow one’,
namely, the epistemic interdependency of learning each individual letter, speaks to the
systematic nature of Promethean natural kinds. Each of the figures that Theuth
transcribes corresponds to a pattern of in human speech, but that pattern’s signifi-
cance (i.e., the reason it constitutes a letter) is recognizable only in the context of its
capacity for coordinating with other patterns of speech in order to produce
components of communication: syllables, words, sentences, and so on. In other
words, the significance of each letter can only be understood, from the perspective of
the craft, as part of a system of causally differentiated kinds contributing to writing as a
whole.27 This is also an aspect of the teleological character of Promethean natural
kinds: the collection of kinds constituting part of ‘nature’s joints’ is a system to be put
to use in the practice of craft.28
Humanbeings benefit from thismethod,which is one reason Socrates attributes
technological advancement to it. Some of these benefits are instrumental. For
example, as the object of human study and instruction, the alphabet allows for the
written transmission of the core epistemic content of all crafts, provides a form of
socialization, and creates new forms of expression (e.g., speeches). Additionally,
there are constitutive benefits of using the method. For example, collecting and
dividing the letters expresses and develops humans’ rational capacities for coming
to understand andmanipulate theworld.29 Similarly, learning the system ofmusical
notes, intervals, and scales through the method provides concrete instrumental
benefits (e.g., the social and cultural tradition of music, a newmeans of expression,
27 However, one need not understand every possible combination of letters in order to make this
discovery; for example, Alpha has a specific kind of contribution tomake to any speech, which one
can learn by seeing how, for instance, that contribution is similar to but different from Iota, and
still more different from Beta, and so on.
28 Onemight wonder, however, about how this is compatible with the plurality of alphabets. Gill
(2012: 222) claims that Theuth’s alphabet is intentionally limited in scope, focusing only on the
differentiae that are relevant to Greek; similarly, Delcomminette (2006: 154) maintains that there
are different ways to divide oral sound. However, I follow Menn (1998: 299), who argues that
Theuth’s process, even if it does not result in an actually international phonetic alphabet, is in form
the sort of activity that results in such an alphabet.
29 Cf. letter-learning as the ‘model of models’ in the Statesman (Plt. 277e–279a), and the idea of
‘letters’ of reality in the Sophist (Sph. 253a–c); see Menn (1998) for discussion.
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new auditory pleasures).30 It also provides constitutive benefits by expressing and
developing human capacities for rationality.31 In each use of the method to learn or
create a craft, the practitioner both learns how toproduce an instrumentally beneficial
goodandexpresses their capacity for intelligence vis-à-vis the productionof that craft-
object. As I describe in more detail below, I think that this kind of coordination of
causal kinds resulting in human benefit as rational creatures is in-keeping with the
general practice of teleological activity: given that humans are rational animals, they
are able to benefit from the intelligent design of a craft system like the letters or
musical notation.32 Accordingly, I suggest that the wisdom that knowledge of
intermediaries confers is a power to produce human goods (cf. Euthyd. 278e–282c,
Prot. 351b–357e), because each domain of intermediary forms is a system that, as a
unified whole, encodes information about the production of craft-objects.33
3 Natural Teleology and Natural Kinds
In this section I continue to make my case that Promethean natural kinds are
teleological by appealing to the connections between the method and Plato’s
teleological natural science. The Timaeus, Plato’s most celebrated and sophis-
ticated attempt at natural science, presents an account of the creation of the
cosmos and formation of its specific cosmological and ecological elements. It is
traditionally and reasonably understood as a ‘teleological’ science answering to
Socrates’ failure in the Phaedo to identify natural causes of how each thing is
ordered such that it is best (Phd. 97b–99d).34 According to the account of the
Timaeus, a divine craftsman (‘the Demiurge’) shapes the world as a whole into a
living complex of body and soul so that it is as good as it can be (29d7–30c1). For
instance, the Demiurge shapes the world-body into proportionate parts of
physical elements and the world-soul into proportionate parts of the mixture of
30 Music is situated as one of the lowest forms of knowledge, but knowledge nonetheless, at
Philebus 56a3–7.
31 For instance, cf. Timaeus’ claim thatmusical harmony allows humans to harmonize their inner
psychic motions (Ti. 80a–b).
32 In the Statesman and Protagoras, similar gifts fromPrometheus confer the capacities necessary
for human beings to lead productive lives in societies rather than struggle to survive in a hostile
natural world (Plt. 274b5–d9, Prot. 321c–322d).
33 In this sense the ‘purposes of agents’ I claimed in the introduction structure natural Prome-
thean kinds are a special class of formalized purposes connected to a craft as such (e.g., the
production of writing, or music). Individual agents can have individual purposes that are at odds
with general human benefit, but those formalized in a craft cannot, on my account.
34 For instance, see Mueller (1999) and Menn (1995).
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sameness, difference, and being (35b–36b). The Demiurge then tasks the gods he
creates with making the avian, aquatic, and terrestrial animals (the three
remaining kinds of animals) in the same way (41a7–d3). The activities of both
kinds of gods explains why it is good for each part of the world to be arranged the
way it is, as they repeatedly go out of their way to make the world the best that it
can be, given certain initial constraints often associated with materiality in some
way (e.g., 29d–30c, 45b–46a, 53a–c).
Socrates offers an example of thisworldview in thePhilebus, with a division of ‘all
there is now in everything’ into four categories: ‘unlimited’, ‘limit’, ‘mixture’, and
‘cause’ (23b5–27c1). According to this division, intelligence is responsible for
combining the limits—which are ratios like ‘the equal andequality, andafter the equal
the double andwhatever is as number to number or measure tomeasure’ (25a7–b2)—
with theunlimited—whichare spectraofproperties,whatever ‘has thenatureof taking
on the more and less’, such as ‘hotter and colder’, ‘dryer and wetter, more and less,
faster and slower, taller and shorter’ (25c5–11)—resulting in the coming to be of
mixtures such ashealth andmusic (26e–27c, 28c–30e). In this respect, intelligence is a
maker, producer, and cause (27a5–6, 27b1–2), and there is a cosmic intelligence that is
the source of human intelligence (29a9–30e3) and responsible for the seasons and the
regular motions of the astronomical bodies (28c6–e6, 30c2–7). In other words,
Socrates models the underlying structure of reality on an intelligent artisan, taking as
their material an unbounded spectrum of difference (e.g., ‘hotter and colder’, ‘drier
and wetter’), and imposing mathematical ratios on this material in order to produce
the complex objects studied by crafts (e.g., health, music, planetary motion).
I claim that this teleological view also applies to the Promethean intermediary
forms that enable human craft.35 In the fourfold division passage, Socrates draws a
parallel between the way that our wisdom provides medical aid and combines other
things for the better, and the way that cosmicwisdom does ‘these same things’ in the
whole cosmos for the beautiful andpure things (30a9–b7).Moreover, included among
themixtures for which intelligence is responsible are music, health, beauty, strength,
and many other ‘extremely fine things in souls’ (25e7–26c2), which suggests that
human intelligenceengages in someactivity that is like cosmic intelligence structuring
the world as a whole (cf. Ti. 42b–d, 46e–47e, 90a–e). I maintain that the Promethean
35 Against objections from Striker (1970) and Frede (1993, 1997), Delcomminette (2006: 201–285),
Carpenter (2007), and Gill (2019) defend continuity between the fourfold division and the ontology
of the Promethean method. In my view, the ‘many’ are ‘unlimited’ in the sense of having infinite
differences, in contrast to having differences that are intrinsic to their unity and so limited by the
content of that unity. In both the Promethean and fourfold division passages, I understand ‘un-
limited’ to capture the relevant properties of the continuum of difference that is measured by the
limits and used by the intelligent cause to produce a craft object. See Gill (2019) and Gosling (1975)
for similar views.
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discovery of craft knowledge is one domain of teleology within this broader
intelligent-design framework, reflecting the fact that themethod is agift from thegods.
For an example of howhuman intelligencemight engage in divine-like activity
through counting kinds, consider the analogy that Socrates draws in the Phaedrus.
Socrates uses partitioning a body into the left and right side in order to illustrate a
natural division of kinds (Phdr. 266a1–2). This establishes a direct analogy between
the natural structure of bodies and the natural structure of divided kinds. As an
example of the natural structure of bodies, according to Timaeus, the created gods,
faced with the necessity of imbuing humans with mortal in addition to immortal
souls, place the immortal kind and themortal kind in separate physical encasings,
the head and the heart (69c–70c). They create a physical boundary between the
two, the neck, as a way of making sure that they achieve their aim of letting ‘the
best’ kind lead (70b8–c1). In this case, a ‘way of life’ is taken as granted: there are
different kinds of soul that need to be supported in a human being, with the
rational kind as the natural ruler. Given these assumptions about a certain way of
life providing goals for the created gods, they are able to design the body that best
supports this way of life by coordinating its parts in order to serve determinate
functions (e.g., the neck is a boundary protecting the rational soul).
Imaintain that Promethean inquiry follows this same teleological pattern: given
a certain way of life, namely, human life, which is, given the nature of the cosmos as
explained in the Timaeus, naturally a life governed by intelligence, an inquirer
learns how to activate the capacities of some domain of raw material (e.g., sound,
humor, wood,metal) into a system that works, overall, to support the humanway of
life and the goals it provides. Different Promethean systems may support different
aspects of human life, but collectively they serve human flourishing, in parallel to
different sub-systemswithin a singlebody.36Accordingly, the causal coordinationof
forms into natural kinds that I articulated in the previous section conforms to the
natural structure of the cosmos as a whole, both (1) in that it involves coordinating
causes in view of a good end, and (2) in that this kind of coordination supports and
sustains rational life, and, indeed, is an expression of rationality.37 In other words,
my interpretation of Plato’s view is as the claim that there is an overlap between the
systems that produce craft objects and the systems that benefit human beings, due
36 For instance, the head, neck, and heart form one sub-system cooperating with the sub-system
of left-and-right sides (e.g., 77c–e).
37 Of course, people can have bad goals—my claim is only that the Promethean method oper-
ationalizes certain of those goals (the ones that express the rational aspect of human nature and
our connection to the divine), which are beneficial for the reasons I describe. Cf. the division of
weaving, discussed below—the ends in question are those of craft as such.
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fundamentally to the fact that humans are intelligent animals and craft systems are
intelligently-designed.38
As I suggested above, Plato offers a direct connection between natural
Promethean kinds and animal bodies in the Philebus itself, which supports my
claim about their parallel natural structures.39 Protarchus, Socrates’ main inter-
locutor, initially mistakes the natural paradox of the one and many (the paradox
prompting the Promethean method of inquiry) as the conjunction of the fact that
there is ‘one self, Protarchus, by nature’, and the fact that there are many and
opposite ‘selves’, because the same subject, Protarchus, is ‘great and small, heavy
and light, andmyriad other things’ (14c11–d3). Socrates unfavorably compares this
to someone both ‘dividing an [animal’s] limbs and at the same time its parts
[τὰ μέλη τε καὶ ἅμα μέρη]’ and maintain that it is ‘one’ (14d8–e4). By contrast, the
paradox to which Socrates calls attention arises when the ‘one’ is taken ‘from the
things that do not come to be or perish’ (15a1–7). While Socrates creates distance
between the two kinds of paradoxes, it is nonetheless plausible that abstract and
imperishable versions of the solutions to the unserious paradox about perishable
objects similarly diffuse the serious paradox of the imperishable one and many.40
One of the problems Socrates raises for imperishable forms that are one and many is
how the many forms can be different sub-kinds and yet, without coming to be or
perishing, are nonetheless consistently the same one (superordinate) form (15b2–4).41
This suggests that there is some a-temporal analogue to the process of becoming that
explains howmany forms are one form—broadly, there are some features of being that
explain eternal and unchanging unity and diversity in the way that there are features
of becoming that explain perishable and mutable unity and diversity. Socrates
38 Moravscik (1979: 93–99) discusses this idea of a normative conception of the ‘natural’, akin to
‘appropriate’. See also the discussion of mixtures in Harte (2002) and cf. the Athenian Stranger’s
anti-materialist, reformative definition of ‘nature’ and ‘natural’ as what is due to the soul in Laws
XII (Lgs. 889a–897a).
39 Muniz and Rudesbusch (2018) offer an interpretation of collection and division that relies
heavily on the body analogy. While this paper is concerned with distinct issues, my position is in
broad agreement.
40 Delcomminette (2002: 22–25), Meinwald (1996: 99–101), and Thomas (2006: n. 12) take similar
positions (Meinwald (1996: 99) also observes the διαιρέω at 14e1 and the διαίρεσις at 15a7). See
Harte (2002: 56–60) for a similar readingof a parallel passage in theParmenides. However, Thomas
(2006: n. 12)maintains that both subordination of kinds (akin to limbs andparts) and compresence
of opposite properties through the blending of kinds (akin to Protarchus being great and small) are
sources of imperishable paradoxes.
41 Following Muniz and Rudebusch (2004). For instance, the puzzle is how the many different
pleasures, such as wise and foolish, are consistently pleasures and wise or foolish without
becoming being wise or foolish from previously being pleasures (cf. 12c6–13a5). Cf. Meinwald
(1996: 100–102) and Delcomminette (2002: 34–40).
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plausibly highlights dividing (διαίρεσις, 15a7) imperishable forms that are one as a
mirror to dividing (διαιρέω, 14e1) the limbs and parts of animals precisely tomake this
point. I take this as reason to think that the natural structure of bodies is analogous to
the natural structure of eternal kinds.
A plausible metaphysical bridge between the naturalness of bodies and the
naturalness of eternal kinds, at least in the Philebus, is a common mathematical
ontology. Following a trend in the literature on the Promethean method, I maintain
that Promethean intermediary forms have numerical values that differentiate them
fromeachother andbind themwithin shared forms through ratios (cf.Rsp. 522c1–8).42
The method’s background ontology, in which the things always said to be have by
nature ‘limit and unlimited’ in them, is plausibly mathematical. As we saw above, in
the fourfold division, Socrates characterizes limitswith the examples of ‘the equal and
equality, and after the equal the double and whatever is as number to number or
measure tomeasure’ (25a7–b2).43 For instance, there are determinate ratios of humors
in the body that constitute human health and determinate ratios of pitch that
constitute the musical notes and intervals (cf. 25e7–26a4).44 Moreover, ‘unlimited’
(ἄπειρος) often has the mathematical sense of an infinite number (LSJ A); it seems
likely that Socrates is drawing on it to characterize the way that numerical measure-
ments of a previously unmeasured material delimit the material and make it intelli-
gible to an artisan.45 Similarly, for instance, according to Timaeus’ account of the
world’s body, numerical proportions ‘naturally’ unite the elements in the body with
the ‘best bond’, ‘one that really and truly makes a unity of itself together with the
things bonded by it’, since ‘this in the nature of things [πέφυκεν] is best accomplished
by proportions’ (Ti. 31c, tr. Zeyl). It is not hard to see how Plato might extend this
mathematical understanding of the created world to the eternal forms at work in
humancraft.As theDemiurge identifies the right ratios tobringout the right capacities
in his material in order to make the best possible world, a Promethean inquirer
identifies the right ratios to bring out the right capacities in their material in order to
determine thebestwayhuman life canbe supportedby thematerial.46 Although these
42 Several scholars maintain that these numbers and measures are ratios of the craft-material
grounding the expertise in question. Barker (1996), Gosling (1975: 170–1), Harte (2002: 177–212),
Meinwald (1998), and Thomas (2006: 217–226). For a somewhat different view, see Delcomminette
(2006), especially pp. 120–121.
43 Barker (1996), Gosling (1975: 170–1), and Thomas (2006: 221–226).
44 Cf. Harte (2002: 185–191), & Barker (1996).
45 Cf. Thomas (2006: 222), Gosling’s (1975: 156–171), and Barker’s (1996).
46 Although the musical example is most straightforwardly mathematical, it is plausible that
voice and other components of oral sound production serve as the determinable domain and the
letters representmathematical ratios along these spectra. A similar model can generalize to health
and other craft-objects.
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forms are eternal and unchanging, they manifest as perishable particulars; in this
sense, the creation of systems coordinating the causal profiles of these particulars is a
discovery of mathematically expressible, eternal, unchanging, and underlying
patterns in the cosmos.
4 Collection and Division
The Philebus is not the only Platonic dialogue to discuss the idea of dividing kinds
naturally. Socrates of the Phaedrus describes two powers that he claims are necessary
for speakingwell, namely, ‘collecting into one form things seen scattered everywhich
way’ and ‘cutting according to forms, the number there are by nature, trying not to
splinter any part, like a bad butcher’ (Phdr. 265d3–4, e1–3). In the Statesman, the
Stranger fromElea claims that his account of the different kinds of expertise in the city
is anexample of dividing ‘according to limbs, like a sacrificial animal’, sincehe cannot
divide kinds of expertise ‘in two’ (287b10–c5). Alongwith the Stranger’s admonition of
Young Socrates for dividing ‘animal’ into ‘human’ and ‘beast’ (Plt. 262c10–263a1),
these passages form the basis for detailed scholarly accounts of Plato’s conception of
natural kinds, and inparticular, the ability of this ‘methodof collection anddivision’ to
articulate natural kinds.47 One question for my account of Promethean natural kinds,
then, is how far-reaching it is, given that the Promethean method is often associated,
and sometimes identified, with some form of collection and division.48 I will not be
able to offer an adequate account of collection and division in general in this paper.
However, I will offer two ideas about how my account of the Promethean method of
the Philebus can in principle extend to Plato’s discussions of collection and division.
First, the teleological character of Promethean natural kinds is arguably a
feature of the Stranger’s second form of division, which can be used as a teleo-
logical form of inquiry. As I noted above, the Stranger explicitly distinguishes
between division ‘in two’ (or ‘dichotomous division’) and division ‘by limbs’. My
emphasis on the body analogy for understanding Promethean inquiry suggests
that the Promethean method is a form of division ‘by limbs’.49 Moreover, the
47 Core issues in the literature are: (1) what constitutes a Platonic natural kind? (2) What formal
procedures does the method of collection and division offer for identifying natural kinds? See
Moravscik (1973)’s groundbreaking work, and the reply from Cohen (1973); more recently, see Gill
(2012), Grams (2012), Henry (2011), Larsen (2020), Menn (1998), Muniz and Rudebusch (2018), and
Wedin (1987).
48 Some scholarsmaintain that the Prometheanmethod is a differentmethod from collection and
division: Gill (2010a, 2012: 214–223), Gosling (1975: 165–181), Harte (2002: 207–8), Moravcsik (1979:
87–93), Ryle (1966: 135), Thomas (2006: 217–221), and Trevaskis (1960). By contrast, see Ackrill
(1997: 99–101), Miller (1990), and Henry (2011: 242–246).
49 This position is also endorsed in Gill (2012: 214–223) and Miller (1990).
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Promethean method’s injunction to ‘count’ ‘however many’ the ‘number’ is of the
many intermediary forms echoes the Stranger’s use of non-dichotomous division to
count however many arts there are in a city and relate them to each other in terms of
their different causal roles (e.g., Plt. 287d–291a). This is significant, since the
Stranger’s use of this form of division is plausibly teleological. For example,
following a dichotomous division of the art of clothes-making from other forms of
expertise (279c7–280a6), he divides the art of weaving from other causally related
arts (its ‘co-workers’, συνεργά) within the art of clothes-making (280e7–283a8). For
example,weaving is clearlydistinguished fromcarding,whichprepares thematerial
to be woven. As a whole, this division organizes the art of clothes-making into a
system of different practices that causally coordinate to produce the human good of
clothing. For another example, the Stranger offers a final division-scheme of the arts
in a city that is plausibly teleological. Modelled on the division of clothes-making,
this division explains howdifferent arts are in charge of, andmakeuse of, other arts,
in order to serve their own ends, with statecraft as the most superordinate expertise
in charge of coordinating all the other arts in a city in order to produce a happy
citizenry (304a–311c).
In this way, there is a plausible case for understanding non-dichotomous
division as capable for teleological inquiry. However, this does not involve
conflating dialectical division and the use of a classificatory system by a crafts-
person. In the articulation of the kinds involved in weaving and in statecraft,
dialectical division is used to capture the relations among sub-kinds that need to be
part of the relevant craftsperson’s (weaver, statesman) knowledge. This is the same
way that the division of sound into the letters captures the relations among sub-
kinds that need to be part of a literate person’s knowledge qua literate. My claim is
that, for this form of division, naturalness is teleological: a sub-kind is natural when
and because it reflects the causal role that kind plays in producing the craft-object in
question.
Second, the lessons from the Promethean method I have argued can be extended
to themethodof divisionwidely alsoplausibly extend towhat Plato callsdialectic in the
Phaedrus (266b3–c1) Sophist (253d1–e2), and Statesman (285d5–7, cf. 284e11–285c2). As
we have seen, Socrates also describes the Promethean knowledge of the ‘in-
termediaries’ as making the difference between ‘eristic’ and ‘dialectical’ discourse. Yet,
it is unclear how dialectic relates to collection and division. While the consensus in the
scholarly literature is that collection and division in some sense facilitates dialectical
knowledge, commentators are divided over how they facilitate it.50 Briefly, I would like
to offer a general sketch of how collection and division might relate to dialectic.
50 See Delcomminette (2006: 110–155), Menn (1998), Henry (2011), Miller (1990), and Moravscik
(1979); contrast Gill (2012), Franklin (2011), Larsen (2020), and Thomas (2006).
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In my view, Plato understands collection and division as a broad and ordinary
practice that we often engage in unreflectively. The Eleatic Stranger sometimes uses
division-language descriptively rather than normatively to indicate a common or
likely practice of dividing a certain subject a certain way (Plt. 262d1–2, 264e3–6,
291e1–5, 306c7–8). He famously uses an ethnographic example of how ‘the people
here’dividehumankind intoGreeks andbarbarians, andhe recommends classifying
people as Lydians and Phrygians only when at a loss (262c10–263a1). The Stranger
and Socrates both suggest that difficulties in making and understanding divisions
arise due to the nature of our linguistic discourse (Plt. 261e5–7, 262d5–6, e2–3,
263d5–6, 275e4–9, 276a9–b6;Phil. 15d4–16a3).51 Similarly, in thePhaedrus, Socrates
claims that collection and division grant him the ability to ‘speak and think’ (Phdr.
266b3–5).52 In this sense, ‘collection anddivision’ is not necessarily an epistemically
virtuous method of inquiry. Rather, collection and division are procedures that can
be virtuous whenmeeting certain conditions. The question is what those conditions
are and whether meeting makes that collection and division dialectical, which I will
not be able to settle here.
However, it is possible that the teleological mode I have attributed to the
Promethean method and connected to non-dichotomous division in the Statesman
represents one stage in the process of developing collection and division into a tool
for dialectical knowledge. In the Philebus, Socrates develops an account of dialectic
as the most precise and true form of knowledge (57e–59e), which distinguishes
dialectic fromnatural scientific knowledge (59a). Natural science involves opinions,
and studies what comes to be and perishes, while dialectic acquires unchanging
knowledgeof eternal and immutable things. I suggest that theuse of thePromethean
method to learn or create crafts like literacy falls somewhere in-between full-scale
dialectic and natural science. Perhaps, for instance, the Promethean method rep-
resents dialectical inquiry into ‘immanent’ forms in the world (i.e., how being
structures becoming), while stopping short of dialectical analysis of being in itself.
This is consistent with Socrates’ strategy of seeking to differentiate forms of
knowledgebased onhowprecise theyare,with dialectic serving as theupper limit of
precision (55d–56a).53 Moreover, it is consistent with the Stranger’s reflection on
using division to become ‘more dialectical’ in the Statesman (285d), and Socrates’
claim that the Promethean method of counting makes the difference between
speaking ‘dialectically’ and ‘eristically’: since one can use the method of division to
be more or less dialectical or speak more or less ‘dialectically’, it is possible for the
51 For discussion of the Stranger’s task as reforming our existing practices and attitudes, see
Franklin (2011) and Larsen (2020).
52 This observation is due to Larsen (2020).
53 On the ‘paradigm’ model of definition, see Carpenter 2015.
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Promethean method to represent one less than perfected kind of dialectical inquiry
specifically relating to expertise.54
5 Conclusion
I would like to conclude by noting two features of the account I have attributed to
Plato in thecontextof thehistoryofnatural kind theory. First,manyscholars view the
pre-Darwinian conception of natural scientific kinds as eternal ‘essences’ inhering in
particular members of the kind, where each essence is a property or set of properties
that is necessary and sufficient for membership in the kind. By contrast, they see the
post-Darwinian conception of natural kinds as ‘populations’ united by causal
mechanisms determining the survival of certain populations and the extinction of
others, so that (1) members of natural kinds may fail to share properties universally
and (2) those properties are contingent features of natural selection rather than
necessary essences.55 While Plato may not have anticipated contemporary theory,
his position is not simply one of a traditional ‘essentialist’. Of course, I have focused
on Plato’s conception of natural kinds according to craft, which are independent of
biological natural kinds. Nonetheless, I have defended a unifiedPlatonic conception
of natural kinds across the natural and social sciences, according to which for a kind
to be natural is for it to stand in a certain teleological causal position with respect to
other kinds in its domain,which isdeterminedbyan intelligent agent. In this respect,
all natural kinds acquire their special metaphysical and epistemic status due to their
relation to intelligent design. Moreover, as a result of Plato’s views about different
kind of intelligence, natural kinds are also pluralistic in the sense of there being
multiple divisions of the same kind (e.g., sound as letters and asmusical notes), and
different levels at which natural kinds exist (e.g., fire as a divine natural kind as
Alpha as a human natural kind). In this way, I aim to re-cast Plato’s place in the
history of natural kind theory, by highlighting the depth of his commitment to
intelligent agency as the most fundamental aspect of the world’s structure.
Second, my account emphasizes Plato’s unique understanding of natural
kinds as socially constructed. By focusing on his rationalist view of human nature,
and its broader representation in the universe, Plato interprets natural kinds as the
product of human or human-like agency. While this view attributes essences to
kinds in a way that justifies and explains social hierarchies,56 it also directly
54 Cf. Gill (2012: chapter 7) and Thomas (2006).
55 See, for example, the discussion in Sober (1980).
56 For example, my account relies on the theory of naturalness in Plato’s Timaeus, which con-
structs female biological difference (90e–91d) to affirm male superiority. Cf. Mercer (2018).
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connects many social essences to human purposes and values. The natural kinds
according to the crafts reflect the human effort to manipulate their world in a way
that supports human life. Moreover, while Plato diminishes the traditional
boundaries between natural and social kinds, my interpretation also finds a place
for a division between the kinds in nature and the kinds in human society, corre-
sponding to the division between divine and human intelligence. These features of
Plato’s view raise several questions about its ideological character, what (if any)
merits it has, and what other lessons it might offer, which I will not pursue here.
My aim is to contribute to the growing literature on themethod of collection and
division, by centering the distinctively social nature of many of Plato’s examples of
collecting and dividing kinds, which is often overlooked.57 Plato’s characters collect
and divide kinds of love (Phdr. 265d5–7, 265e3–266b1); crafts (Sph. 219a4–8), like
farming (219a10), fishing (221c2), retailing (223d3–4), and sophistry (264d7–268d4);
kinds of knowledge (Plt. 258b6–7), like rule or domination (258e8–259d5),
communal care (276a1–277a2), constitutions (300c5–303d2), and political classes
(287c11–291a4, 303e7–311c7); and (if we count the Philebus, as I have suggested)
musical notes and rhythms (Phil. 17c11–e3), letters (17b6–9, 18b6–d2), and pleasures
(19b2–8). The position I have defended advances our understanding on this front by
demonstrating how Plato’s Promethean method organizes the domains of expert
human knowledge in conformitywith Plato’s teleological conception of theworld as
a whole.
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